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In innovation contests, the progress of the competing ﬁrms in the innovation process
is usually their private information. We analyze an innovation contest in which
research ﬁrms have a stochastic technology to develop innovations at a ﬁxed cost,
but their progress is publicly announced. We make a comparison with the case of no
information revelation: if the progress is disclosed, the expected proﬁt of the ﬁrms
is higher, but the expected proﬁt of the sponsor is lower. Additionally, we show that
ﬁrms may voluntarily reveal their information.
JEL: O32, D82, D72
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1 Introduction
Contests have been used to stimulate research in a variety of contexts: from refrigerators
over computer programs to aerospace research. To win the contest, only the best ﬁnal
innovation of all competitors matters. Nevertheless, if the progress of the participating
ﬁrms is publicly known, intermediate stages of the research process already reveal interim
leaders. This knowledge inﬂuences future research eﬀorts. It is thus important to identify
the impact of intermediate information revelation both from the participants’ and from
the contest designer’s viewpoint. Intuitively, information disclosure has two major op-
posing eﬀects on research eﬀort. On the one hand, the publication can serve as a kind of
positive coordination device for the participants, prohibiting excessive research: a ﬁrm will
decrease research eﬀort due to the observation of a very valuable or a worthless innovation
made by her opponent. On the other hand, the additional information can also expand
research eﬀort: if the competitor of a ﬁrm turns out to unexpectedly have a slightly better
innovation, a ﬁrm might discover the need for an improvement.
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From the ﬁrms’ perspective, the disclosure policy leading to lower research costs is prefer-
able. In contrast, the contest designer cares about the value of the best innovation. In this
paper, we use a contest model with multiple stochastic research opportunities to compare
two settings: obligatory intermediate information revelation by the ﬁrms opposed to keep-
ing their progress secret. Both the ﬁrms’ and the contest designer’s view are analyzed.
Furthermore, we study the possibility of endogenous information revelation.
Examples for information disclosure in contests occur in diﬀerent areas. When a new
drug needs to be developed, diﬀerent pharmaceutical ﬁrms conduct research. To test the
eﬀectiveness of a new drug – and thus its chances of beating the rivals’ developments –
ﬁrms conduct clinical trials. These trials can be publicly registered in a trial registry like
clinicaltrials.gov, giving also the opportunity to post a short result summary. Speciﬁcally,
for drugs, biologics and medical devices regulated by the US Food and Drug Administra-
tion, U.S. Public Law forces sponsors of clinical trials to post results on their eﬀectiveness
in such a trial registry1. Additionally, some voluntary disclosure of research results takes
place in the trial registries and peer-reviewed journals. Similarly, the performance of par-
ticipants in the Netﬂix Prize (www.netﬂixprize.com) can be seen on a public leaderboard.
Netﬂix, a popular video renting company, pays a prize of $1,000,000 for a new algorithm
to predict the movie preferences of a user based on the past ratings he submitted. The
accuracy of an algorithm is measured by a single number, which can only be ascertained
by submitting the algorithm to the website. Interestingly, the website publishes the best
result of each contestant automatically.
To capture the inﬂuence of intermediate information revelation on the participants’ in-
centives to innovate, we compare two settings in the framework of an innovation contest,
which only diﬀer in the treatment of intermediate information. We model an innovation
contest in the spirit of Taylor (1995): two ﬁrms have the possibility to make stochastic
innovations at a ﬁxed cost. Firms can develop up to two independent innovations. They
decide sequentially whether they innovate or not. As it is common in contests, only the
best of all innovations wins a ﬁxed prize. The main decision problem of a ﬁrm appears
after the ﬁrst innovation is made: how good are the chances to beat the other ﬁrm with
the current innovation? Should a second one be developed? Of course, information on the
quality of the opponent’s innovation has signiﬁcant impact on the ﬁrm’s decision. Hence,
we compare two diﬀerent versions of the model: in the benchmark setting, following Tay-
lor (1995), no information about the ﬁrst innovations is revealed. In our basic setting,
intermediate information disclosure is mandatory. We extend it to include the possibility
of voluntary information revelation, the main focus of this paper.
In most of the paper, a key assumption is the independence of innovations. It is moti-
vated by interpreting diﬀerent innovations as substantially diﬀerent ideas that have to
be explored independently. Speciﬁcally, we treat one innovation as fully developed and
neglect small improvements due to extended research on an already completed innova-
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tion2. Consequently, in case of information revelation, the model does not leave room for
spillovers between the ﬁrms. In a sense, spillovers are assumed to be smaller than the
diﬀerence between ﬁrms’ innovation values and would thus have no eﬀect on the contest
winner anyway. This is also in line with the revelation policy in both examples. There,
only simple summary statistics of the contestants’ performances are publicly available.
Hence, competitors know how good their opponents are – but they do not know how
they did it, so no direct spillovers are possible. Furthermore, in an extension of the basic
model, we use a diﬀerent interpretation of a multi-round innovation contest and model
the innovation process as an improvement of a single idea over several stages.
Surprisingly, only very mild assumptions on the distribution of innovation values are
needed for the analysis of the basic model, which has two ﬁrms and two periods. In fact,
the results essentially turn out to hold true independent of the speciﬁc functional form
of the distribution of innovation values. Instead, the relative size of the ﬁnal prize to the
cost of developing an innovation is the most important parameter for the ﬁrms’ incentives.
The analysis of the basic model with mandatory information disclosure shows that both
ﬁrms innovate in the ﬁrst period in case the prize is not too low compared to the costs
of developing an innovation. Then, second-period equilibrium behavior depends on the
value of the ﬁrst-period innovation according to two cutoﬀs: if one ﬁrm has an innovation
value in the high range, the leading ﬁrm is conﬁdent to win, while the probability for
the following ﬁrm to develop something better is too low compared to the costs. Hence,
both stop innovating. Similarly, if the highest innovation is in the intermediate range,
only the follower continues to innovate – and if both innovations are below the lower
cutoﬀ, both ﬁrms continue. We show that the total number of innovations – and thus
the research costs – is lower in this equilibrium compared to the equilibrium with secret
innovation values. Thus, there is a coordination eﬀect which is favorable for the ﬁrms:
a contest with information disclosure leads to lower expected research costs and thus a
higher expected payoﬀ for the ﬁrms. Yet, this does not necessarily mean that the prize
sponsor prefers the setting without information disclosure: he cares about the expected
value of the highest innovation, which is diﬀerent from the total number of innovations.
As ﬁrms stop innovating when they observe a high innovation value, the coordination
eﬀect could be strong enough to compensate for the lower total number of innovations.
We show that this is not the case if the prize/cost-ratio is suﬃciently high. Consequently,
the prize sponsor gets a higher expected innovation in the setting without information
disclosure. If a prize sponsor is able to enforce this secrecy, he should thus do so. However,
if he does not do so, ﬁrms might be willing to voluntarily reveal their ﬁrst-period value.
We pursue this question by modeling voluntary disclosure in two diﬀerent ways: in the
ﬁrst version, the ﬁrms decide in an ex ante-game whether they are going to reveal after
the ﬁrst period or not. In the second version, the decision to disclose is delayed until ﬁrms
2Another way to think about independent innovations is the proof of a theorem: one approach might
fail and its a completely diﬀerent one that will lead to a success.Information Disclosure in Innovation Contests 4
learn their ﬁrst-period innovation value. In both cases, it turns out that there is essentially
a unique equilibrium in which both ﬁrms disclose. Continuing this train of thought, the
voluntary revelation has consequences for the contest designer: if he chooses the size of
the prize optimally, he should choose it with respect to the setting where information is
revealed in case he does not prevent voluntary disclosure. We also prove the existence of
an equilibrium with voluntary revelation in case there are n ﬁrms or m periods.
In the extension with improving innovations, given mandatory information revelation the
decision whether to continue research in the second period does not only depend on the
leader’s value, but also on the value of the runner-up. The cutoﬀs identiﬁed for the basic
model still exist qualitatively but change in their quantitative value. Particularly, the
incentives to continue research increase for the ﬁrms, as it becomes more likely that the
runner-up can produce a better second-period innovation. Nevertheless, the main result of
this paper carries over to this setting with improving innovations: there is an equilibrium
where ﬁrms voluntary reveal their own value.
This paper extends the analysis of research tournaments by Taylor (1995). In his model
with a secret innovation process, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which ﬁrms
continue to innovate if their best innovation value does not exceed a certain threshold.
Due to the information disclosure, which we introduce in our version of the model, a
second cutoﬀ value arises – the contestants are able to coordinate. Of course, the approach
followed by Taylor (1995) is not the only one to model research contests. For example,
Che and Gale (2003) ﬁnd the optimal contest to be an auction given a deterministic
research technology, Schoettner (2008) builds on the famous model by Lazear and Rosen
(1981) to show that given a stochastic innovation technology, ﬁxed-prize contests may in
fact be superior to a ﬁrst-price auction. Also building on Taylor (1995), Fullerton et al.
(2002) study auction-style research tournaments. Finally, Baye and Hoppe (2003) show
that there is a strategic equivalence between diﬀerent models of rent-seeking, patent races
and innovation contests.
The idea of intermediate revelation of research results is also studied by Gill (2008) in
the context of patent contests with exogenously given leader and follower. In his model,
research is a two-stage process where both steps are necessary to develop a single in-
novation. We use value distributions similar to his distributions in our extension with
improving innovations. In Gill’s model, the leader decides whether or not to disclose his
performance after the ﬁrst stage. Then, the follower may choose to drop out after the ﬁrst
stage. Whether or not the leader discloses depends on the research costs. By contrast,
in our model leader and follower are endogenously determined, as multiple innovations
can be developed. Furthermore, in Gill (2008) the patent winner is determined randomly,
while in our model the best innovation wins for sure. In Aoyagi (2010) all information on
intermediate performance is controlled by the contest designer. Related to our model, per-
formance is stochastic. Furthermore, it is additive over the two rounds, while we mostly
consider multiple independent innovations. The optimal feedback policy to the partici-Information Disclosure in Innovation Contests 5
pants regarding this information is derived – it depends on the shape of the cost function
whether a no-feedback or a full-feedback policy is optimal. In a related paper, Gershkov
and Perry (2009) study the design of midterm reviews. Given a ﬁxed prize, it is always
optimal to have such a review, if the results of intermediate and ﬁnal review are optimally
aggregated.
This paper also connects to the literature on multiple-round contests. In Konrad and
Kovenock (2009), contestants have to win several component contests, modeled as all-pay
auctions, to win the overall prize. Contrary to our model, the follower is not fully dis-
couraged from continuing the contest even if he is far behind. Moldovanu and Sela (2006)
investigate how to split contestants over sub-contests where only the winners continue
to compete. In Yildirim (2005), building on work by Dixit (1987), heterogeneous partici-
pants can split their eﬀort over two rounds with observable ﬁrst-round eﬀort. Similar to
one result in this paper, information disclosure can be endogenized by an ex ante game:
agents can choose between non-observable eﬀort (which equals one-shot play there) or
two-round eﬀort with intermediate revelation. In equilibrium they decide to reveal eﬀort.
In our model, we also get voluntary revelation – however, it is revelation of (stochastic) in-
novation values and not of eﬀort. Furthermore, our model does not boil down to one-shot
play in case of secret intermediate results.
Finally, an experimental study of information disclosure is provided by Ludwig and Lu-
enser (2008). They compare two settings with and without intermediate information re-
lease, where equilibrium play is not aﬀected by the information structure. Nevertheless,
subjects in the experiments behave diﬀerently if they observe their opponent’s eﬀort.
The paper is organized as follows: the basic model and equilibrium behavior with informa-
tion disclosure is presented in Section 2. We compare it to the benchmark case without
disclosure in Section 3. In Section 4 we endogenize information revelation. Extensions
with a second innovation that improves the ﬁrst one and with n ﬁrms and m periods are
considered in Section 5. Finally, we conclude in Section 6. Proofs can be found in the
Appendix.
2 The Model and Equilibrium Derivation
We consider two risk-neutral research ﬁrms, i = 1,2. They compete in an innovation
contest to win a ﬁxed prize p > 0. Firms are assumed to know the prize sponsor’s utility
function over research outcomes. Both ﬁrms have an innovation technology similar to Tay-
lor (1995): research is modeled as drawing an innovation x out of a probability distribution
F with strictly positive density f. F is deﬁned on [0,b] with b ≤ ∞. Each innovation draw
is associated with a cost of c > 0 for each ﬁrm. Firms are not capital constrained. There
are two periods t = 1,2 in which ﬁrms may innovate. Innovation values xt
i are independent
across periods and ﬁrms. For each ﬁrm, only the best draw (max{x1
i,x2
i}) is relevant for
the contest. The ﬁrm with the highest draw wins the contest and the prize of p. TiesInformation Disclosure in Innovation Contests 6
are randomly broken. We assume that innovations that do not win have a value of zero
outside the contest, so that loosing innovations cannot be sold afterwards. In contrast to
Taylor (1995), in the basic version of our model we assume in the spirit of Yildirim (2005)
that ﬁrst-period innovations become common knowledge after both ﬁrms have made their
decision whether to conduct research or not, and have taken their draw.
We ﬁrst analyze equilibrium behavior of the two ﬁrms. We look for subgame perfect Nash
equilibria by backward induction and thus start with the second period. First note that for
p < c both ﬁrms would make a loss from conducting research. Thus, both do not conduct
any research (neither in the ﬁrst nor in the second period). Consequently, we focus on the
case c ≤ p. Additionally, we will narrow the reasonable prize/cost combinations further
down later.
2.1 Second Period
Suppose at least one ﬁrm has taken a draw in the ﬁrst period, such that one of the two
ﬁrms has taken the lead, x1
H > x1
L ≥ 0. H stands for the ﬁrm with the higher ﬁrst round
innovation (the leader) and L for the ﬁrm with the lower innovation (the follower). We
calculate best responses:
If the follower does not continue to innovate, it is a best response for the leading ﬁrm to
stop innovating as well – she will win in any case.
So suppose now the ﬁrm with the higher value does not draw again. Then, the ﬁrm with



























This inequality deﬁnes a threshold x∗ indicating an innovation high enough to make all
ﬁrms stop research. x∗ solves the following equation:
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Then, if some x > x∗ is drawn by any of the two ﬁrms, the contest stops immediately and
no new research will be conducted in the second round: the follower has no incentive to
draw again if the leader has already drawn such a high innovation. Then, the leader will
obviously not draw again as well.
Now consider the case x1
H ≤ x∗, such that the ﬁrm with the lower value wants to draw
again if the leader does not. What is the best response of the leader against the drawing



















































.Information Disclosure in Innovation Contests 7
This inequality deﬁnes a threshold ¯ x making both ﬁrms innovate again if there is no
innovation above it. ¯ x solves






and note that ¯ x < x∗. What is the best response of the follower against a leader drawing
again for x1



































   











  2 p − c ≥ 0
because x1
H ≤ ¯ x. Hence, (3) is fulﬁlled. Consequently, the follower wants to draw again in
the second round as well. This is intuitive: the leader already has an advantage after the
ﬁrst round, so incentives for the follower to draw again are even higher.
We summarize our ﬁndings in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Given ﬁrst-period innovations x1
H > x1
L, there are the following second-
period equilibrium strategies:
• If x1
H > x∗ both ﬁrms stop their research eﬀort and the contest ends after the ﬁrst
period.
• If x∗ ≥ x1
H > ¯ x only the follower conducts research in the second period.
• If ¯ x ≥ x1
H both ﬁrms conduct research in the second period.
Note that for small prize values p < 2c we get ¯ x < 0, thus, the leader will never draw
again in the second period. Furthermore, the proposition implies that there are no mixed
equilibria:
Corollary 2 Given ﬁrst-period innovations x1
H > x1
L there is no second-period equilibrium
in which players mix at values other than ¯ x and x∗. Thus, the equilibrium in Proposition
1 is almost everywhere unique.
It follows immediately from Proposition 1 that a leading ﬁrm with x1
H > ¯ x does not
do any research irrespective of the following ﬁrm’s behavior and is thus playing a pure
strategy. Similarly, a follower with x1
L < ¯ x will always do research. Thus, neglecting the
cutoﬀ values, there is always at least one ﬁrm playing a pure strategy, with a pure best
reply by the other ﬁrm according to Proposition 1.
Let us now consider the case that both ﬁrms did not innovate in the ﬁrst period, which
is important for the calculation of ﬁrst-period equilibrium behavior.Information Disclosure in Innovation Contests 8
Proposition 3 Suppose both ﬁrms did not innovate in the ﬁrst period. Then, there are
the following second-period equilibrium strategies:
• If p ≤ 2c, there is an equilibrium where both ﬁrms do not conduct any research in
the second period.
• If p ≥ 2c there is an equilibrium where both ﬁrms conduct research in the second
period.
The proof is given in the Appendix. Note that if at least one ﬁrm takes a draw in the
ﬁrst period, a tie appears with zero probability, and thus second-period equilibrium play
is almost everywhere unique in the sense of Corollary 2 for almost all possible ﬁrst-period
realizations. For this reason, we can safely skip the calculation of equilibria in case x1
1 = x1
2:
this case will appear with zero probability given any ﬁrst-period play and we will thus
not need it in future calculations.
2.2 First Period
The ﬁrst-period pure-strategy equilibria can be now derived, taking into account second-
period equilibrium play. As the main focus of this paper is on information revelation after
the ﬁrst period, we are especially interested in the conditions under which both ﬁrms
start innovating in the ﬁrst period. If they do not innovate in the ﬁrst period, information
revelation is only of minor interest. It turns out that the size of the prize compared to
the innovation costs is the crucial parameter for ﬁrst-period innovation to take place. We
make use of the following short notations: r := c
p and s :=
√
2r.




















Then, v∗ < 1
2 and in the ﬁrst period, we get the following pure-strategy equilibrium behavior
with ﬁrms continuing in the second period as described in Proposition 1:
• For r > 1
2 both ﬁrms do not conduct any research in the ﬁrst period.
• For 0 < r < v∗ both ﬁrms conduct research in the ﬁrst period.
• For 1
2 ≥ r > v∗ equilibrium behavior is asymmetric – one ﬁrm conducts research,
the other does not.
Proof See Appendix. ￿
Numerically, v∗ is given by v∗ ≈ 0.2428 and by Proposition 4 both ﬁrms conduct research
if c
p = r < 0.2428. This means that a prize value of p ≈ 4c is high enough to ensure the
maximum amount of research in the ﬁrst period.Information Disclosure in Innovation Contests 9
The proposition shows that if the prize is too low compared to the costs, both ﬁrms
will invest neither in the ﬁrst nor in the second period. Additionally, there are two pure-
strategy equilibria if r takes intermediate values. Furthermore, there is a more prominent
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in this case as well, which we do not calculate here
because we focus on r < v∗ in the following: we are interested in information revelation
with ﬁrms in fact doing research in the ﬁrst period. This problem has no meaning if the
setting is such that ﬁrms do not have full incentives to invest in the ﬁrst period – and
these incentives are already given at a very reasonable prize level. There is thus no need
to consider the mixed equilibrium here.
3 Comparison with No Information Release
In this section, we compare the setting with information release after the ﬁrst period,
which we just analyzed, with the setting known from the literature (Taylor 1995) where
information is kept secret after the ﬁrst period. We want to ﬁnd the preferred setting
for both the ﬁrms and the contest designer. First, we compare the settings from the
perspective of the ﬁrms, then we turn to the contest designer.
3.1 Firms’ Perspective
To analyze the ﬁrms’ perspective, we compare the expected number of innovation draws in
the setting with information revelation to no information revelation after the ﬁrst period
– ﬁrms prefer the setting with lower research costs, which means less innovation draws
in this context. The ﬁrst step is to calculate the expected number of draws dR(r) in the
equilibrium with information release, given that both ﬁrms do research in the ﬁrst period.
Proposition 5 Given r < v∗ the expected number of draws in equilibrium fulﬁlls dR(r) =
4 − 2s + r2.
Proof See Appendix. ￿
We now come back to the setting of Taylor (1995), where no information is released. He
shows that there is a unique equilibrium in which ﬁrms play a stopping strategy with
stop value z: they take draws as long as they do not have an innovation that exceeds z
and stop as soon as an innovation exceeds z. However, Taylor does not calculate the z
explicitly but characterizes it implicitly. We rewrite his implicit characterization to make
it suitable for our purposes. According to Proposition 2 in Taylor (1995), z is the solution
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Calculating the integral, this can be rewritten as follows:
0 = p(1 + F(z))






















(1 + F(z))(1 − F(z))
2 − c
⇐⇒ 0 = (1 + F(z))(1 − F(z))
2 − 2r (4)
The ﬁrst line follows by factoring out 1+F(z) and changing the notation of the integration.
The second line uses integration by parts. Unfortunately, the explicit solution of this
equation is quite messy. The following lemma gives a feeling of the size of z.
Lemma 6 For p > 2c the stop value in the setting without information release is between
the two thresholds of the setting with information release, ¯ x < z < x∗.
Proof See Appendix. ￿
We make a comparison between the setting of Taylor (1995) and our setting. As the
expected number of innovations a ﬁrm makes represents her cost, we compare the number
of draws the ﬁrms take in expectation in each setting. For our case with information
revelation we already calculated the expected number of draws (dR(r), Proposition 5).
For the setting without information revelation, the expected number of draws can be
written as dNR(r) = 2(1 + F(z)) (a ﬁrm is drawing again if and only if the ﬁrst period
value did not exceed z, this happens with probability F(z)). z is implicitly deﬁned by (4)
for a given r.
Proposition 7 Considering 0 < r < v∗, the expected number of draws dNR(r) in case no
information is revealed after the ﬁrst period is larger then the expected number of draws
dR(r) in case information is revealed, dNR(r) > dR(r).
Proof See Appendix. ￿
We immediately get the following corollary, as both players win in expectation 1
2p in
equilibrium in both settings, but have lower costs in the setting with information disclosure
because they take less draws:
Corollary 8 For 0 < r < v∗, both research ﬁrms prefer the setting with information
disclosure over the setting without information disclosure.
Note that r < v∗ is exactly the range of r-values guaranteeing research draws by both
ﬁrms in the ﬁrst period. This is the range we focus on as revelation decisions after the
ﬁrst period are only interesting if ﬁrms do innovate in the ﬁrst period.Information Disclosure in Innovation Contests 11
3.2 Designer’s Perspective
From the prize sponsor’s perspective, a higher number of innovation draws is in principle
favorable, as more draws suggest a higher expected ﬁnal prize. However, it is not obvious
that this relationship really holds in this context: draws are taken conditional on already
realized innovations. Thus, if a draw is not taken, a good innovation has already been
made. But the equilibrium decision rules whether another draw is taken diﬀer between
the two settings. Thus, a higher number of draws is an indicator for a higher expected
ﬁnal innovation, but does not allow a sure conclusion.
The key to the comparison from the designer’s perspective is the highest expected inno-
vation generated by the two diﬀerent settings. The designer prefers the setting yielding
the higher one.
To calculate the highest expected innovation for the two settings, we need the respective
distribution functions of the highest innovation. In the setting without information release,
the two ﬁrms are innovating independently. Let Φ be the distribution of the highest
innovation for a single ﬁrm. Then, the joint distribution is given by Φ2. Using the result






F 4(x) if x ≤ z
(F(x) − F(z) + F(z)F(x))
2 if x > z
For the setting with information revelation, the two ﬁrms do not innovate independently.
The distribution Ψ of the joint highest innovation has the following structure, given the
equilibrium play of the two ﬁrms – they both draw in the ﬁrst period as we assume r < v∗:
Ψ(x) =

   
   
F 4(x) if x ≤ ¯ x
A if ¯ x < x ≤ x∗
B if x∗ < x
Denote the highest innovation in period j by x
j
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Given these distribution functions, we can calculate which setting provides the higher
expected innovation – no information revelation is preferred if the following condition










2(x) − Ψ(x)dx ≤ 0. (5)
Note that, diﬀerent to the results from the ﬁrms’ perspective, it depends on F whether
condition (5) is fulﬁlled or not. This is because the designer cares about the absolute valueInformation Disclosure in Innovation Contests 12
of the innovations, while the ﬁrms care about their relative ranking. Additionally, the size
of r is crucial for the proﬁtability of the settings. We provide a bound on r such that (5)
is fulﬁlled independent of F. This bound is called v′:
Theorem 9 The expected value of the highest innovation is larger in the setting without
information revelation if r < v′ holds. Then, this setting is preferred by the prize sponsor.
The derivation of v′ can be found in the Appendix. It basically uses a stochastic dominance
argument: the integrand of the integral on the left-hand side of (5) is shown to be negative
on the whole interval [0,b] when r < v′ = 0.1647. However, this bound is in general not
binding, as the solution to (5) (with equality) diﬀers for each F. For example, for F being
the uniform distribution on [0,1], a calculation of (5) shows that the designer prefers the
setting without information revelation for all relecant r-values (r < v∗).
4 Endogenous Information Release
We have seen in the previous section that ﬁrms prefer the setting with information dis-
closure after the ﬁrst draw to the setting without information disclosure. However, the
contest designer has opposite preferences, and he is the one to choose the setup. This
raises the question whether ﬁrms could play the information revelation setting by volun-
tary revelation of their ﬁrst-period innovation value.3 We take two approaches to model
this: ﬁrst, we extend our model by adding a stage zero where ﬁrms can ex ante decide
whether to disclose the level of their innovation after the ﬁrst draw or not. This is an
extension in the spirit of the analysis in Yildirim (2005). Second, we consider an inter-
mediate decision, where the ﬁrms only decide whether they disclose the information after
having observed the value of the ﬁrst-period innovation.
4.1 Ex Ante Decision
We add an initial stage zero in which the ﬁrms simultaneously decide whether to reveal
their information (action R) or whether they do not reveal (action N). The decision is
observable. It is our goal to identify equilibria of this simultaneous-move game to ﬁnd out
whether the analysis in the previous sections can be supported by endogenous information
revelation. This would be the case if (R,R) is an equilibrium of this game. In case both
ﬁrms play R, the contest following afterwards is the same as the one described in the
previous sections. Hence, we already know the corresponding equilibrium strategies. The
same holds true in case both ﬁrms play N. Then, we are back in the setting of Taylor
(1995). To derive the best responses in this initial stage, we need to deduce the equilibrium
strategies in the case of asymmetric information revelation. In the resulting contest, one
3We implicitly assume that the contest designer either does not set rules to prevent voluntary revelation
or is not able to enforce such rules.Information Disclosure in Innovation Contests 13
ﬁrm reveals her ﬁrst draw, the other one does not. We will analyze equilibria by backward
induction. To provide incentives for research, we focus on the main case p > 2c in the
following, and assume thus r < 0.5.
For the second-period equilibrium, we take the ﬁrst draw as given. One ﬁrm has played R
in the initial stage, we denote her draw by x1
R and call her ﬁrm R. The draw of the ﬁrm
playing N (short: ﬁrm N) is denoted by x1
N.
Proposition 10 In the setting with asymmetric information release, given ﬁrst-period
innovations x1
R and x1
N, there are the following second-period equilibrium strategies:
• Firm R takes a second draw iﬀ x1
R < z.
• Firm N takes a second draw iﬀ x1
N < x1
R < x∗ or ¯ x > x1
N > x1
R.
In case ﬁrm N does not take a draw in the ﬁrst period, it is the best reply for ﬁrm R to
take a second draw iﬀ ¯ x > x1
R. Firm N takes a draw in the second period if x1
R < x∗.
In case ﬁrm R does not take a draw in the ﬁrst period, it is the best reply for ﬁrm N to
take a second draw iﬀ ¯ x > x1
N. Firm R always takes a draw in the second period.
Proof See Appendix. ￿
Roughly speaking, ﬁrm R thus behaves as in the setting with no information release,
while ﬁrm N plays the same strategy as with full information release. If both ﬁrms do not
innovate in the ﬁrst period, they both take a draw in the second period, as we assumed
p > 2c. Note that Proposition 10 w.l.o.g. ignores the case x1
R = x1
N for values larger than
zero, as it appears with zero probability – it is thus not payoﬀ relevant and we can safely
omit it here.
The ﬁrst-period equilibrium behavior can be summarized as follows (again, we do not
calculate possible mixed equilibria, as we later on focus on r-values inducing an equilibrium
with research in the ﬁrst period):























4 − F(z)ˆ v = 0
where F(z) is determined by (4) with r = ˆ v.
Furthermore, let ˜ v be the solution to
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Then, in the ﬁrst period of the contest with asymmetric information disclosure we get the
following pure-strategy equilibrium behavior with ﬁrms continuing in the second period as
described in Proposition 10:
• For r < ˆ v there is an equilibrium where both ﬁrms draw in the ﬁrst period.Information Disclosure in Innovation Contests 14
• For 0.5 > r > ˜ v there is an equilibrium where ﬁrm R draws in the ﬁrst period and
ﬁrm N does not.
• For 0.5 > r > ˆ v there is an equilibrium where ﬁrm N draws in the ﬁrst period and
ﬁrm R does not.
The proof is given in the Appendix. Numerically, we can approximate ˆ v ≈ 0.2623 and
˜ v ≈ 0.1722. Note that ﬁrm R plays diﬀerent strategies in the two equilibria involving a
draw by ﬁrm R: as Proposition 10 shows, ﬁrm R will continue to innovate in less cases
if ﬁrm N does not innovate in the ﬁrst period. Consequently, the best reply of ﬁrm N is
aﬀected by the change in strategy, yielding two diﬀerent equilibria involving a draw by
ﬁrm R in the range ˜ v < r < ˆ v. We focus in our analysis on the symmetric equilibrium
involving draws by both ﬁrms. It is also unique for small r-values.
With this characterization of pure-strategy equilibria we are ready to address the main
question of this section: are the two ﬁrms willing to ex ante commit to revealing their
information after the ﬁrst draw or not? The answer is given by the following theorem:
Theorem 12 Let ¯ v solve
5
24


























4 = 0, (6)
where F(z) is determined by (4) with r = ¯ v.
For r < ¯ v there is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which both ﬁrms ex ante commit
to revealing their information after the ﬁrst period. For r < ˜ v it is unique.
The proof is given in the Appendix. A numerical approximation gives ¯ v ≈ 0.2325. Hence,
we have shown that the disclosure of information can be endogenized – the ﬁrms are
voluntarily agreeing to it ex ante.
4.2 Intermediate Decision
So far, we modeled the revelation decision as taking place before any research is done
by the ﬁrms. In that setup, ﬁrms need to be able to commit to their decision. In the
following, we drop the assumption that ex ante commitment is possible – the revelation
decision is postponed after the ﬁrst period, when ﬁrms are able to observe their ﬁrst
innovation. As the revelation decision works as a kind of signaling device, a ﬁrm holds a
belief on the value of the other ﬁrm’s innovation. We thus reﬁne our equilibrium concept
to Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Nevertheless, ﬁrms reveal the information voluntarily, as
the following theorem shows:
Theorem 13 If ﬁrms i = 1,2 can make their revelation decision simultaneously after
learning their ﬁrst-period innovation value xi, in a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium both
ﬁrms reveal their value if xi  = x∗. If xi = x∗ ﬁrm i is indiﬀerent between revealing orInformation Disclosure in Innovation Contests 15
not. The revelation decision in a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is thus unique up to ﬁrms’
behavior for value x∗. Oﬀ the equilibrium path, in case one ﬁrm does not reveal, the other
ﬁrm believes the deviating ﬁrm has value x∗ with probability 1 and reacts accordingly.
The intuition for the proof is as follows: no ﬁrm has an incentive to hide her value – then,
she would be treated as a ﬁrm with value x∗, which is no improvement no matter what
the true value of the ﬁrm is. Revelation in combination with this punishment thus forms
an equilibrium. To show the uniqueness, one has to consider the fact that a ﬁrm wants to
show that she has a high type (and discourage lower types from continuing to innovate)
or a low type (and make intermediate types stop innovating). For intermediate types, one
can show that if a ﬁrm keeps the information secret, she does so for an interval of values.
However, for the lowest of these values a ﬁrm has an incentive to reveal – she does not
want to pool with higher values against which the other ﬁrm would more often like to
continue innovating. The details of the proof are given in the Appendix.
5 Extensions
5.1 Second Innovation as Improvement
So far, we modeled the two innovations in the two periods as substantially diﬀerent ideas:
the resulting innovation values do not depend on each other and represent fully devel-
oped innovations. A diﬀerent way of thinking about a multi-period contest is to interpret
the second-period innovation not as a new idea, but as an extension of the ﬁrst-period
innovation that improves the innovation value. As a consequence, the distributions of the
innovation values in the two periods are not the same (as they have been in our model so
far), but the second-period distribution depends on the value of the ﬁrst-period innova-
tion. In this section, we adapt our model to this interpretation and show that voluntary
revelation also appears when the second-period innovation builds on the ﬁrst-period in-
novation.
Notation and assumptions stay the same except for the distribution functions: for tractabil-
ity reasons we assume in this section that F is a uniform distribution on [0,1] with
F(x) = x. Furthermore, in the second period, ﬁrm i can improve her innovation by taking
a draw from the distribution Fi(x|x1
i) at costs c. We assume that Fi is derived from F

















We start our analysis by identifying the equilibrium behavior of the two ﬁrms in the
second period in case information is revealed after the ﬁrst period. Again, we assume
that the prize is high enough compared to the costs such that both ﬁrms innovate in the
ﬁrst period, which surely guarantees r < 1
2. The leading ﬁrm, with the higher ﬁrst-periodInformation Disclosure in Innovation Contests 16
innovation value, is once more denoted by H, the following ﬁrm with the lower innovation
value by L. Thus, we have x1
H > x1
L, again omitting the equality case as it appears with
zero probability and is thus not payoﬀ relevant.
Proposition 14 Given ﬁrst-period innovations x1
H > x1




L)r both ﬁrms stop innovating and the contest ends after the ﬁrst
period.
• If 1 − (1 − x1
L)2r < x1
H ≤ 1 − (1 − x1
L)r only ﬁrm L innovates in the second period.
• If x1
H ≤ 1 − (1 − x1
L)2r both ﬁrms innovate in the second period.
Proof See Appendix. ￿
Compared to the equilibrium with independent innovations, the continuation decision
does not depend only on the leader’s value, but also on the value of the runner-up. This
leads to an increased amount of research. Particularly, as in the independent case, the
runner-up will always continue to innovate if the leader’s value is below 1 − r = x∗ – but
additionally, he will also continue to innovate for higher values of ﬁrm H if his own ﬁrst-
period value, x1
L, is not too far behind. Similarly, the leading ﬁrm will always innovate if
her own value is smaller than 1−2r > 1−
√
2r = ¯ x, which is already a larger set than in
the case with independent values (where ﬁrm H only continues for x1
H ≤ ¯ x). Furthermore,
the leading ﬁrm will also continue if the runner-up is only close behind. This is a major
strategic diﬀerence to the case with independent values: two innovations of approximately
the same size are worth almost the same. It is much less important which ﬁrm has the
lead.
What is the eﬀect of this strategic diﬀerence on voluntary revelation? If the revelation
decision is made after the ﬁrst period, the equilibrium in Theorem 13 uses a maximum
punishment idea: if ﬁrm i does not reveal its value ﬁrm j believes ﬁrm i has value x∗,
making ﬁrm j continue to innovate for the largest possible set of values – which is a bad
thing for the hiding ﬁrm i. On the contrary, if the second innovation builds on the ﬁrst
one, ﬁrm i with a ﬁrst-period innovation value above x∗ can in fact proﬁt from keeping
the value secret for some values of ﬁrm j in the top range: if ﬁrm j believes to face a ﬁrm
i with value x∗, hiding goes along with an underestimation of i’s value by ﬁrm j, making
j stop innovating for these values. However, at the same time a ﬁrm j with a value at the
lower end will continue to innovate although she would stop if she knew the true value of
i. We thus have two opposing eﬀects. In the following theorem we show that the latter
eﬀect is the dominating one and voluntary revelation extends to this model of improving
innovations.
Theorem 15 If ﬁrms i = 1,2 can make their revelation decision simultaneously after
learning their ﬁrst-period innovation value x1
i and the second innovation always improvesInformation Disclosure in Innovation Contests 17
the ﬁrst innovation, there is a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which both ﬁrms reveal their
value. Oﬀ the equilibrium path, in case one ﬁrm does not reveal, the other ﬁrm believes
the deviating ﬁrm has value x∗ with probability 1 and reacts accordingly.
Proof See Appendix. ￿
Note that there will be no equilibrium in which both ﬁrms always hide their value: there
is always an interval at the lower end of possible values for which it is beneﬁcial to reveal,
showing the opponent that the own value is much lower than he expected. Compared to
no revelation, this makes the opponent stop innovating for some medium values and is
thus proﬁtable for a ﬁrm with a low value realization.
5.2 n Firms and m Periods
Voluntary revelation of intermediate research results is not limited to the case of two ﬁrms
and two periods we have studied in detail until now. In this section, we extend the main
result with independent research draws and an intermediate revelation decision to n ﬁrms
(and two periods) and m periods (and two ﬁrms).
We start with the case of n ﬁrms and two periods, otherwise the setting is the same as
with two ﬁrms. Again, we assume that the prize is large enough compared to the cost
to make all ﬁrms innovate in the ﬁrst period. Particularly, all participating ﬁrms should
make nonnegative proﬁt as they would not innovate at all otherwise. We thus assume that




In second-period equilibrium play with information disclosure, compared to the case with
only two ﬁrms, incentives to innovate are lower if more competing ﬁrms are present.
Particularly, if ﬁrm i has a ﬁrst-period innovation better than x∗, no other ﬁrm will try
to beat ﬁrm i in the second period. Furthermore, as long as no other ﬁrm is continuing to
innovate, the incentives for ﬁrm j  = i to draw in the second period are the same as in the
case with only the two ﬁrms i and j. Hence, some research is going on in period two if the
highest value of the ﬁrst period, x1
H, is smaller than x∗. In a pure strategy equilibrium,
only one ﬁrm will continue to innovate for values slightly below x∗, and there will be
additional thresholds at lower values of the leading ﬁrm for which more ﬁrms continue to
innovate. As this type of equilibrium is asymmetric, it comes along with a coordination
problem. We will thus focus on a symmetric equilibrium which is in mixed strategies: for
values slightly lower than x∗, all ﬁrms will continue to innovate with a positive probability
depending on x1
H, q (x1
H). This probability is obviously ﬁxed by making all ﬁrms that areInformation Disclosure in Innovation Contests 18
not in the lead indiﬀerent between drawing or not. The largest value of x1
H for which all
other ﬁrms draw with probability one is denoted by ˆ x:









By deﬁnition, all ﬁrms who are not in the lead make zero proﬁt if x1
H = ˆ x. Thus, as all
these ﬁrms draw with probability one in this case, we can conclude that each of these ﬁrms
wins the contest with probability r = c
p, as p   c
p − c = 0. Consequently, the remaining
winning probability is with the leading ﬁrm, who wins with probability 1 − (n − 1)r
and does not draw herself, as due to the current leadership the incentives to draw are
strictly lower for this ﬁrm. Thus, the leading ﬁrm wins exactly if all drawing ﬁrms have a
second-period value lower than ˆ x, and we can conclude that
F (ˆ x)
n−1 = 1 − (n − 1)r ⇐⇒ F (ˆ x) =
n−1  
1 − (n − 1)r.
We summarize these results in the following proposition4.
Proposition 16 Given the largest ﬁrst-period innovation x1
H, in the symmetric second-
period equilibrium strategies
• no ﬁrm draws if x1
H > x∗,
• non-leading ﬁrms draw with probability q (x1
H) if ˆ x ≤ x1
H ≤ x∗, with q (x1
H) ∈ (0,1)
for ˆ x < x1
H < x∗,
• non-leading ﬁrms draw if ˆ x > x1
H,
• the leading ﬁrm does not draw if ˆ x ≤ x1
H.
As in the previous sections, we endogenize the information disclosure by letting ﬁrms de-
cide whether they reveal or not after learning their ﬁrst-period value. Again, the equilib-
rium we derive builds on maximum punishment: if a ﬁrm hides her ﬁrst-period innovation
value, the other ﬁrms believe that a hiding ﬁrm has value ˆ x, as stated in the following
theorem:
Theorem 17 If ﬁrms i = 1,2,...,n can make their revelation decision simultaneously
after learning their ﬁrst-period innovation value x1
i, there is a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
in which all ﬁrms reveal their value. Oﬀ the equilibrium path, in case one ﬁrm does not
reveal, the other ﬁrms believe the deviating ﬁrm has value ˆ x with probability 1 and reacts
accordingly.
Proof See Appendix. ￿
4Note that Proposition 16 is not a full equilibrium characterization but contains only the parts nec-
essary for our purposes.Information Disclosure in Innovation Contests 19
If all other ﬁrms have a value smaller than ˆ x, they will all continue to innovate and the
punishment is maximal. However, contrary to the case with two ﬁrms, there is potentially
some room for beneﬁting from these beliefs about a hiding ﬁrm. Suppose the second high-
est value is x1
L, and the values are ordered as follows: x∗ > x1
H > x1
L > ˆ x. If ﬁrm H hides
her value, the remaining ﬁrms will believe that ﬁrm L is in fact the leading ﬁrm. Partic-
ularly, this will make ﬁrm L stop innovating in the second period – this is in the interest
of ﬁrm H. Hence, as this constellation of values only happens with some probability, the
main part of proving the eﬀectiveness of the punishment is thus to show that the expected
loss from the other value constellations outweighs this potential gain.
Next, we consider m periods and two ﬁrms. The prize is assumed to be large enough
compared to the costs such that both ﬁrms innovate in the ﬁrst period. Suppose ﬁrst
that revelation is mandatory. Then, if one ﬁrm has an innovation with a value above
x∗, incentives to continue innovating are similar to the second period of the two period
case and it is never beneﬁcial to continue innovating. The following corollary is a direct
consequence of the corresponding argument in Proposition 1.
Corollary 18 Consider an innovation contest with two ﬁrms, m periods and mandatory
information revelation. Suppose ﬁrm i made an innovation in period t with xt
i > x∗. Then,
in any following period both ﬁrms do not innovate. In case the ﬁrm i made the highest
innovation in period t and xt
i = x∗, ﬁrm j  = i is indiﬀerent between innovating or not in
any following period where xt
i = x∗ is still the highest innovation.
Now suppose the revelation decision of the ﬁrms is voluntary and they can decide after
each period whether to reveal or not. As a consequence of Corollary 18, it is immediate
to see that the threat of Theorem 13 has bite with m periods as well:
Corollary 19 Suppose ﬁrms i,j = 1,2 can make a revelation decision simultaneously
after learning their innovation value of each period t = 1,...,m − 1. Then, there is
a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which both ﬁrms always reveal their value. Oﬀ the
equilibrium path, in case ﬁrm i does not reveal, ﬁrm j believes the deviating ﬁrm i has
value x∗ with probability 1. Then, ﬁrm j continues to innovate until she has an innovation
better than x∗ or ﬁrm i reveals such an innovation.
For ﬁrm i, hiding the own value will lead to the maximum punishment, ﬁrm j innovates
in the next period for all values smaller than x∗. This is always worse for ﬁrm i then
revealing, as there is no potential future advantage of an additional innovation of ﬁrm j
for ﬁrm i.
6 Conclusion
We show that in a basic innovation contest with multiple rounds, ﬁrms and contest de-
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results. Although the contest designer prefers ﬁrms to keep intermediate information se-
cret, they are able to establish voluntary revelation of their research progress. For most
of our analysis of the basic model – which has two ﬁrms, two periods and independent
innovations – only mild assumptions on the research technology are needed. Furthermore,
our main result of voluntary revelation turns out to be very robust: we consider extensions
to n ﬁrms, m periods and improving innovations. The possibility of voluntary revelation
has an impact on the prize setting by the contest designer. Suppose he wants to set his
prize optimally, uses a setting without information disclosure (which he prefers) and does
not prevent voluntary revelation. Then, if the ﬁrms decide to disclose on their own, using
the optimal prize with respect to secret information can lead to a lower payoﬀ for the
designer than the optimal prize with respect to mandatory information disclosure. Con-
sequently, the contest designer should then choose his prize as if information disclosure
was mandatory.
Considering further extensions of the model, the most prominent one would be a joint
examination of n ﬁrms, m periods and improving innovations. The existing results suggest
that voluntary revelation would extend to this setting as well. Furthermore, we did not
fully characterize the equilibrium research behavior for multiple ﬁrms and periods in the
setting with mandatory information disclosure. Particularly, we simply assumed that the
prize is large enough compared to the costs such that all ﬁrms start innovating in the ﬁrst
period. From a quantitative perspective, it would be possible to explicitly calculate the
respective critical prize/cost ratios, although it has no impact on the qualitative nature
of the results. Furthermore, our extension with improving innovations only considers a
uniform distribution – it would be interesting to see the impact of a change in distribution.
A completely diﬀerent extension could be made by considering heterogeneous ﬁrms with
diﬀerent research costs or diﬀerent research technologies. As long as the heterogeneity
is only mild, we do not expect qualitative eﬀects on the results, although quantitatively
heterogeneity will lead to diﬀerent cutoﬀs for the ﬁrms.
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A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose ﬁrm i decides not to draw again. Then, not drawing again is a best response for






























Thus, we get that both ﬁrms not drawing again is an equilibrium if (7) holds.
Here, we can directly see that both ﬁrms do not want to draw in the second period in
case p < 2c. Even if both ﬁrms did not invest in the ﬁrst period, and a ﬁrm could win for
sure by conducting research, expected proﬁt is higher if no research is done.Information Disclosure in Innovation Contests 22
Let us get to the best response in case ﬁrm i decides to draw in the second period. Then,
drawing is a best response for ﬁrm j  = i according to the following condition:
1
2























Hence, both ﬁrms drawing again is an equilibrium if (8) is fulﬁlled, which is obviously
the case for p ≥ 2c. Again, we can see that a ﬁrm does not want to draw again in case
p < 2c. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4
To derive ﬁrst-period equilibrium play, ﬁrst consider the case p < 2c. As we have seen,
both ﬁrms will not invest in the second period in case no research is done in the ﬁrst
period. If research is conducted by at least one ﬁrm, only the lower ﬁrm might invest
again, because ¯ x < 0 if p < 2c. By backward induction, we can conclude that both ﬁrms
will not draw in the ﬁrst period: we have seen in the analysis of the second period that
a single draw is too expensive for a ﬁrm even when it wins for sure. In the ﬁrst period,
incentives for conducting research are even lower. An investing ﬁrm will not win for sure,
as the other ﬁrm might decide to invest in the second period. Hence, both ﬁrms will not
invest in the ﬁrst period if the prize is too low. This is no problem for the ﬁrms, as they
make a positive expected proﬁt of 1
2p. It is a problem of the prize sponsor, who will get
no research done but has to pay the prize anyway.
So let us consider the case p ≥ 2c. What is the best response against an opponent not
































i ≤ ¯ x
 





= 1 − s
We can thus write down the condition for player i taking a draw in the ﬁrst round
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2 ≥ 0 (9)
We thus have to show now that (9) holds. To check this, we calculate the minimum of the
left side in (9) with the help of the substitution t :=
√









2t − 1 = 0













Only the positive solution matters here, as t =
√
r is restricted to be positive. Hence, we




2 ≈ 0.2679, leading to an expected gain from drawing compared to not
drawing of approximately 0.0654 > 0, which is clearly a minimum on [0;0.5] (r ≤ 0.5
holds as p ≥ 2c). Hence, it is always a best response to draw in the ﬁrst period if the
opponent does not take a draw.
Finally, we get to the best response of ﬁrm i in case the other agent j  = i takes a draw
in the ﬁrst period. We compare the expected proﬁt of drawing as well (and thus playing
the same strategy and sharing the prize) with the expected proﬁt of not drawing in the
ﬁrst period. Note that we just calculated above the expected share of the prize a ﬁrm
gets when taking a draw in the ﬁrst period against a ﬁrm not taking a draw in the ﬁrst
period. We can thus subtract this share from the whole prize to get the share of the ﬁrm
not drawing against a drawing ﬁrm.
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Computing the probabilities yields
1
2
p − c −
 
(1 − s)(1 − r) +
1
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3 ≥ 0 (11)
We can see that the left side of (11) is decreasing by checking the ﬁrst derivative, bearing
in mind that r ∈ [0,0.5]:
−1 +
√









Numerically, we get that the left side of (11) equals zero for r ≈ 0.2428 – we call this
boundary value v∗. Hence, drawing as well is a best response for all r < v∗ = 0.2428. For
larger r values, ﬁrm i does not want to draw in the ﬁrst period if ﬁrm j takes a draw. ￿
Proof of Proposition 5
Both ﬁrms take a draw in the ﬁrst period. At least one additional draw is taken in case







∗) = (1 − r)
2.
A second additional draw is taken in case both values are below ¯ x:
P(x
1
i ≤ ¯ x)P(x
1
j ≤ ¯ x) = (1 − s)
2.
This gives us a total number of
dR(r) = 2 + (1 − r)
2 + (1 − s)
2 = 4 + r
2 − 2s
concluding the proof. ￿
Proof of Lemma 6 First, we show that the right-hand side of (4) is decreasing in F(z).








2 − 2y − 1 < 0. (12)




2 − 2r = (2 − r)r
2 − 2r = 2r(r − 1) − r
3 < 0,
which holds as r < 1




2 − 2r < 0 = (1 + F(z))(1 − F(z))
2 − 2r
and consequently F(x∗) > F(z) by (12). As F is increasing, this shows x∗ > z.
Similarly, for ¯ x < z we use (2):
(1 + F(¯ x))(1 − F(¯ x))
2 − 2r = (2 − s)2r − 2r = 2r(1 − s) > 0,
which holds as s =
√
2r < 1 by r < 1
2. Consequently, ¯ x < z follows as above. ￿Information Disclosure in Innovation Contests 25
Proof of Proposition 7
First note that
dNR(r) > dR(r) ⇐⇒ 2(1 + F(z)) > 4 − 2
√
2r + r











2r2. In the proof of Lemma 6 we showed that the right-hand side of (4)
is decreasing in F(z). Hence, it is suﬃcient to plug 1 −
√
2r + 1
2r2 into the right-hand




2r2 directly follows as F(z) solves (4) (and thus yields a lower right-hand
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The third line follows by r < v∗ < 0.25 and thus −
√
2r > −3
4. Similarly, the ﬁfth line
follows by −r > −1
4 and the last line by r > 0. ￿
Proof of Theorem 9
We derive a condition on r making
  b
0 Φ2(x) − Ψ(x)dx < 0 in a rather coarse way by
looking for a non-positive integrand on the whole interval [0,b]. We proceed in several
steps, cutting the interval into diﬀerent parts:
i) [0, ¯ x]
In this case, it is easy to see that
  ¯ x
0 Φ2(x) − Ψ(x)dx =
  ¯ x

















2 − F(¯ x)
2 
      
>0
dx < 0.
















1 + 2F(z) + F(z)




      
=:h(x)
dx
We now show that the integrand h(x) is negative by analyzing its ﬁrst derivative,
which is given as follows:
h
′(x) = F(¯ x)
2 − 2F(z) − 2F(z)
2 + 2F(x)
 
1 + 2F(z) + F(z)









2 − F(¯ x)
2 
      
>0
(2F(z) − 1)
      
>0 for F(z)> 1
2
















and consequently h′(z) is positive in this case. Additionally, a numerical check shows
that h′(x∗) is positive as well (for all z ∈ [0,b]). Furthermore, h′ is a quadratic
function which has a maximum (this follows from h′′′(x) = −6). Taking these facts
together, we get that h′ is positive on [z,x∗] given r < 0.1875. Hence, h is increasing
on [z,x∗]. A numerical check shows that h(x∗) < 0 for r < 0.1647 – thus, for these
r-values h is negative on the whole interval (as it is largest at x∗).
iv) (x∗,b]





















2 − F(¯ x)
2 
      
=:l(x)
dx
As l(x∗) = h(x∗), we know that l(x∗) is negative for r < 0.1647. Furthermore, l is a
quadratic function having a minimum (as l′′(x) = 2(2F(z) + F(z)2 − F(¯ x)2) > 0).
Hence, as l(b) = 0, l is negative on (x∗,b].
Thus, we can conclude that the integrand (and thus the whole integral) is negative if
r < 0.1647 = v′ holds. ￿Information Disclosure in Innovation Contests 27
Proof of Proposition 10
First, we know from Proposition 1 that no ﬁrm will draw again in case she knows that an
innovation larger than x∗ has been drawn. The conclusion of this proposition applies to
asymmetric information release as well: in the situation of Proposition 1 a ﬁrm does not
want to draw again even if she knows that she is behind. If a ﬁrm with such a high draw
does not know the opponent’s draw, incentives for drawing again are even lower.
Additionally, Proposition 1 implies that ﬁrm N will not draw again if x1
N > ¯ x and x1
N >
x1
R. We ﬁrst consider the following case: both ﬁrms have taken a draw in the ﬁrst round.
Firm R has a draw ¯ x < x1
R < x∗ and faces the decision whether to draw again or not.
For the moment we assume that ﬁrm N behaves according to Proposition 1 and thus
draws again if she is behind (the case of equality of draws can be ignored from ﬁrm R’s
perspective as it is a zero probability event). It is beneﬁcial for ﬁrm R to draw again if







































































































































Note that (13) has the same structure as (4). Hence, ﬁrm R will draw again exactly in
case her ﬁrst draw is smaller than z, which solves both (4) and (13). We denote F(z) =: w
in the following.
For the calculation above, we assumed that ﬁrm N follows the strategy described in
Proposition 1, but it is not clear that this strategy is a best reply. Obviously, it is a best
reply in case ﬁrm N is leading, as x1
R > ¯ x. Not drawing is then proﬁtable even against an
opponent who draws. However, it could be proﬁtable for ﬁrm N to stop drawing in case
she is behind and ﬁrm R has a draw ¯ x < x1
R < z with x1
R > x1
N. In this case, ﬁrm R will
draw again as well – she would not do so if she knew that she is in front, as it is the case






































































  2 p − c
≥0Information Disclosure in Innovation Contests 28
The strict inequality holds by direct comparison (and 0 < F (x1
R) < 1). The last inequality
holds as x1
R < z in this case and (13) applies. Hence, it is in fact a best reply for ﬁrm N
to follow the strategy derived in Proposition 1.
If the draw of ﬁrm R fulﬁlls x1
R < ¯ x, the incentives to draw again are the same for ﬁrm
N as in Proposition 1. Hence, ﬁrm N behaves similarly here. For ﬁrm R, we consider an


































































































































The latter is the expected proﬁt of ﬁrm R without a second draw. Hence, drawing again
is beneﬁcial for ﬁrm R.
What happens if one of the ﬁrms plays a strategy where she does not take a draw in
the ﬁrst period? If ﬁrm N faces a ﬁrm R taking no draw, the second period behavior is
similar to playing against a ﬁrm with a draw of zero. For ﬁrm R, things change: if she
faces a ﬁrm not drawing in the ﬁrst period, her best reply is similar as in the situation
of full information release. Thus, if she believes with probability one that she faces a
not-drawing ﬁrm, she plays the same strategy as ﬁrm N in that case: she will only draw
again if x1
R < ¯ x. ￿
Proof of Proposition 11
In the ﬁrst period, both ﬁrms have to compare the expected proﬁts of taking a draw with
the expected proﬁts of waiting one period. Consider ﬁrst the case of ﬁrm R not drawing
in the ﬁrst round. What is the best reply of ﬁrm N? This is basically the same exercise
as deriving inequality (9), with one slight diﬀerence: ﬁrm N is not able to discourage
ﬁrm R from taking a draw in case x1
N > x∗. This slightly reduces the probability of
winning the prize for ﬁrm N compared to the setting of full revelation: it is now possible
that ﬁrm R beats ﬁrm N with a draw x2
R > x1
N > x∗. This is the case with probability
1
2 (1 − F (x∗))
2 = 1
2r2. We can include this probability change into (9) by subtracting 1
2r2,









2 ≥ 0 (14)
The analysis of the ﬁrst order condition shows that the left side of (14) has a minimum
at r = 1
2. For r = 1
2, equality holds in (14). Hence, taking a draw is proﬁtable for ﬁrm N
in the ﬁrst period in this case.Information Disclosure in Innovation Contests 29
What is the best reply for ﬁrm R against this strategy of ﬁrm N? We ﬁrst calculate the
probability for ﬁrm R to win the prize if she is taking a draw in the ﬁrst period (and
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¯ x < x
2
N < z




































































¯ x < x
2
N < z





























































N < ¯ x
 
  
Using the short notations P(x > ¯ x) = s, P(x < z) = w and P(x > x∗) = r, simplifying





























p − (1 + w)c (15)
Furthermore, we have to calculate the expected proﬁt of ﬁrm R when she is waiting forInformation Disclosure in Innovation Contests 30























































N > ¯ x












p − c. (16)
Drawing in the ﬁrst period is thus proﬁtable if the value of (15) is larger than the value

























































































4 − wr ≥ 0.
A numerical analysis shows that the left-hand side equals zero for r ≈ 0.2623 – we call
this critical value ˆ v. For larger r values ﬁrm R prefers to wait for the second period to
take her draw. In this case, we showed that there is an asymmetric equilibrium with ﬁrm
N drawing in the ﬁrst and ﬁrm R drawing in the second period. Firm N then follows her
second-period equilibrium strategy.
For smaller r values, ﬁrm R takes a draw in the ﬁrst period as well. To conﬁrm that this
constellation is consistent with an equilibrium behavior, we have to check the incentives





























































































p − (1 − r)c. (17)
We compare this with the expected proﬁt of taking a draw. As part of (15), we already
calculated the probability that ﬁrm R wins the contest in case both ﬁrms take a draw
in the ﬁrst round. Consequently, this number and the probability that ﬁrm N wins this






































c. (18)Information Disclosure in Innovation Contests 31




















































































2 − r + rs ≥ 0.
Again, a numerical analysis shows that the left hand side equals zero for r ≈ 0.2939. For
smaller r values, the inequality is fulﬁlled and drawing in the ﬁrst period is proﬁtable for
ﬁrm N – we found an equilibrium in that case. For larger r values, ﬁrm N’s best reply is
not to draw in the ﬁrst round. We thus have to check how ﬁrm R’s best reply against a
waiting ﬁrm N looks like (with respect to correct beliefs). Note that ﬁrm R will only draw
again in the second-period equilibrium if x1
R < ¯ x. Hence, incentives to draw are similar
to the case of full information release and result in condition (9). The analysis of that
condition showed that it is thus proﬁtable for ﬁrm R to draw against a waiting ﬁrm N.
Finally, we have to analyze the incentives of the waiting ﬁrm N – is it proﬁtable to draw
against a drawing ﬁrm R who believes to face a ﬁrm N that does not draw? The expected




















































¯ x < x
2
N < x



































R < ¯ x
 










































If ﬁrm N does not draw in the ﬁrst period, she is in the same situation as in the right











































p − (1 − r)c.
Simplifying and using s =
√
















This condition holds for r < 0.1722, as a numerical analysis shows. We call this critical
value ˜ v. Given this condition, we are back in the situation where both want to draw (and
our previous analysis showed that this is an equilibrium for this range of r-values). For
r > 0.1722, ﬁrm N does not want to draw and we are hence in an equilibrium as well –
the best reply for ﬁrm R against a ﬁrm N that does not draw is to draw. ￿Information Disclosure in Innovation Contests 32
Proof of Theorem 12 We focus our analysis on the ﬁrst equilibrium identiﬁed in Propo-
sition 11. In this equilibrium, both ﬁrms take a draw in the ﬁrst period and it is unique for
r < ˜ v. In the initial stage zero, where ﬁrms choose whether to reveal or not, we now have
to identify the best responses of the two ﬁrms. What is the best response of a ﬁrm, if the
other ﬁrm chooses to play R? If she plays R as well, they share the prize in expectation
and 2−s+ 1
2r2 research draws are taken by each of the ﬁrms. If a ﬁrm deviates to play N,
the expected costs of drawing do not change (as she still gets the same information and
plays the same strategy). However, it may happen that she receives in expectation less









































The left-hand side of (19) states the proﬁt for the ﬁrm deviating to N, as derived in (18).
A r-value of ¯ v ≈ 0.2325 solves (19) (which is equivalent to (6)), and for r < ¯ v a ﬁrm
playing N against R receives in expectation less than half the share of the total prize.
Combined with the fact that research costs do not change, it is the best response against
a ﬁrm playing R to play R as well for these values.
What is the best response against a ﬁrm playing N? Playing N as well gives in expectation
half of the prize while taking 1+w draws. As we have just seen, a ﬁrm playing R receives
in expectation more than half the prize against a ﬁrm playing N for r < ¯ v. Additionally,
she has to take the same number of draws in expectation. Hence, it is proﬁtable to play
R against a ﬁrm playing N.
A ﬁrm will thus always play reveal in the initial stage, no matter whether the other ﬁrm
plays reveal as well or not. ￿
Proof of Theorem 13 We ﬁrst show that it is in fact an equilibrium. Note that the
point of revealing (or not revealing) is to make the other ﬁrm stop researching in as many
cases as possible. Suppose ﬁrm i deviates and does not reveal her value. This deviation
cannot be beneﬁcial: if ﬁrm j has a value xj > x∗, the reaction of this ﬁrm does not
change – she always stops researching in this case. Additionally, if xj < x∗, ﬁrm j will
continue to do research, and thus goes on in the maximum number of cases. Revealing a
value xi < x∗ would have made a ﬁrm with value xj ∈ (xi,x∗) stop researching, increasing
the chances of ﬁrm i to win.
To show the uniqueness, suppose there is another equilibrium in which at least one ﬁrm
hides a value diﬀerent from x∗. Consider the strategy of ﬁrm i, and ﬁrst assume that
this ﬁrm always keeps the information secret in case xi ∈ X1 ⊂ (x∗,b] (and reveals her
value for xi / ∈ X1). Thus, in equilibrium, if ﬁrm j observes that ﬁrm i does not reveal any
information, she correctly believes that xi > x∗. Consequently, ﬁrm j stops innovating, no
matter what value her ﬁrst-period innovation has. This provides ﬁrm i with an incentive to
always keep her information secret, as this will make ﬁrm j stop. Hence, in any equilibrium
where information is kept secret for values in X1, this has to be done also for some valuesInformation Disclosure in Innovation Contests 33
xi ∈ X2 ⊂ [0,x∗]. Furthermore, X2 has to be large enough such that ﬁrm j continues
to innovate for some values xj when receiving no information by ﬁrm i (and believing
correctly that xi ∈ X1 ∪ X2). However, if xi ∈ X1, ﬁrm i has a proﬁtable deviation by
simply revealing her value and making ﬁrm j stop innovating in any case. Thus, there
cannot be an equilibrium in which ﬁrm i with value xi ∈ (x∗,b] keeps this value secret.
A similar reasoning applies in case we assume that information is kept secret only for
values xi ∈ X3 ⊂ [0, ¯ x] – ﬁrm j with any xj ∈ (¯ x,x∗) would stop innovating, and ﬁrm i
with xi ∈ (¯ x,x∗) had an incentive to keep her information secret and make ﬁrm j stop for
these xj. Additionally, consider the case of a set X4 ⊂ (¯ x,x∗) for which values are kept
secret on top of X3 (making some xj ∈ (¯ x,x∗) continue to innovate): then, it is proﬁtable
for xi ∈ X3 to reveal and make ﬁrm j stop innovating for all xj ∈ (¯ x,x∗). Thus, there
cannot be an equilibrium in which ﬁrm i with value xi ∈ [0, ¯ x] keeps this value secret.
Finally, consider the case where information is kept secret by ﬁrm i for values xi ∈ X5 ⊂
(¯ x,x∗). Then, ﬁrm j will continue to innovate for all xj < inf X5 if she does not observe
any information by ﬁrm i. As a ﬁrm i with a value xi ∈ X5 decides to keep her information
secret, ﬁrm i in equilibrium cannot be better oﬀ by revealing (and making ﬁrm j continue
for all xj < xi). Thus, there can be no set X6 with xj ∈ X6 continuing to innovate in
equilibrium and X6∩(inf X5,x∗) having a positive mass. Otherwise, there would be some
x′
j ∈ X6 ∩ (inf X5,x∗) dividing this set in two parts with a positive mass. Consequently,
some xi ∈ X5 ∩ (inf X5,x′
j) would exist for which ﬁrm i had a proﬁtable deviation by
revealing her type (and making ﬁrm j stop innovating in the part above x′
j). This shows
that in equilibrium ﬁrm j does not continue to innovate for all xj ∈ (inf X5,x∗), if she
does not observe information by ﬁrm i. Keeping this in mind, we can conclude that X5
is in fact an interval of the form (inf X5,x∗) (possibly including the end points, which
we ignore for notational purpose). Suppose this were not the case. Then, there is some
xi ∈ (inf X5,x∗) for which ﬁrm i would reveal her value. However, she could do strictly
better for that value by keeping the information secret and making ﬁrm j stop innovating
for all xj ∈ (inf X5,xi).
So suppose ﬁrm i keeps the information secret for such an interval, (x′
i,x∗)  = ∅. Then, as
we just showed, ﬁrm j does not continue to innovate for values xj ∈ (x′
i,x∗) if she does not
observe any information. Consider some x′′
i ∈ (x′
i,x∗). From the equilibrium derivation in
case of full information revelation we know that any xj ∈ (x′
i,x′′
i) makes a positive proﬁt
against x′′
i by continuing to innovate. We denote the average expected proﬁt of drawing
for ﬁrm j against values in (x′′
i,x∗) by δ (it is independent of the size of xj, as long as
xj < x′′
i). Against all values in (xj,x′′
i), the expected proﬁt is even larger than δ. Now
consider some ﬁxed xj < x′′
i for which the probability that ﬁrm j is in the lead if she
does not receive any information is less or equal to ε. If ﬁrm j would deviate for xj and
continue to innovate, this would have two eﬀects: on the one hand, she would make an
expected proﬁt of at least δ against ﬁrm i having a higher valuation (up to x∗). On the
other hand, she could maximally waste the cost of drawing c if she faces a ﬁrm i withInformation Disclosure in Innovation Contests 34
a value in (x′
i,xj), as the one-sided deviation of an additional draw cannot make ﬁrm j
loose more often. This only happens with probability ε. Thus, innovating is proﬁtable for
ﬁrm j with value xj ∈ (x′
i,x′′
i), if the following condition holds:
(1 − ε)δ − εc > 0
As this condition is fulﬁlled for ε small enough, ﬁrm j has the proﬁtable deviation to
continue innovating. Thus our initial assumption is not true and we cannot have an
equilibrium where any ﬁrm keeps the information secret for values other than x∗. In case
their ﬁrst-period value is x∗, ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between revealing or not – but this event
has zero probability. ￿
Proof of Proposition 14
Suppose ﬁrst the leading ﬁrm H does not innovate in the second period. Then, it is
































H ≤ 1 − (1 − x
1
L)r
For ﬁrm H, there is only a possible need of continuing to innovate if the other ﬁrm is also























































H ≤ 1 − (1 − x
1
L)2r
The second line follows as ﬁrm H will always improve her ﬁrst period innovation and beats
a ﬁrm L that also improves upon x1
H in exactly half of the cases because we assumed a
uniform distribution.
Finally, we have to check that ﬁrm L has no incentives to refrain from innovating in the





















p − c ≥ 0
which is the same condition as for ﬁrm H – both ﬁrms continuing to innovate is thus an
equilibrium if this condition is fulﬁlled. ￿
Proof of Theorem 15
We check whether ﬁrm i has an incentive to deviate for a value x1
i. Suppose ﬁrst that
x1
i < x∗ = 1 − r. Then, hiding the value makes ﬁrm j continue to innovate for a strictly
larger set of ﬁrst-period values: Proposition 14 shows that ﬁrm j makes a second innovationInformation Disclosure in Innovation Contests 35
for x1
j ∈ [0,1−(1−x∗)2r], which is a superset of the set of values for which ﬁrm j would
draw if she knew x1
i, [0,1 − (1 − x1
i)2r]. Firm i has thus no incentive to hide the value.
The more interesting case is given by x1
i > x∗. We ﬁrst pin down the expected proﬁt of
ﬁrm i with given value x1
i when both ﬁrms reveal their true value. Applying Proposition
14 to determine the ranges for which the two ﬁrms continue to innovate and the resulting










































































































































































































































If ﬁrm i hides her own value, ﬁrm j believes that ﬁrm i has value x∗ and acts accordingly.
However, as we want to look at the one-sided deviation of ﬁrm i, ﬁrm j still reveals her
value. Depending on the size of x1
i, the decision whether to innovate in the second period
or not changes. To write down the expected proﬁt of ﬁrm i when hiding her value, we
thus have to make a case distinction.
First case. We start with the case x1
i < 1 − (1 − x∗)2r = 1 − 2r2, such that ﬁrm i will























































1 − (1 − x
∗)2r < x
1





































































































































































































































































First note that x1
j ≥ x1
i on [1 − 2r2,1 − (1 − x1









































































(r − (1 − x
1
i)) > 0 ⇐⇒ x
1
i < 1 − r
2.
This is true, as by assumption x1
i < 1 − 2r2 < 1 − r2. We can conclude that ﬁrm i does
not want to deviate and hide her value for x1
i < 1 − 2r2.
Second case. The next case is 1−4r3 > x1




2r < 1 − 2r2. Furthermore, the relationship 1 − 4r3 > 1 − 2r2 is always fulﬁlled asInformation Disclosure in Innovation Contests 37
r < 1

























































































































































































































































































Thus, by using 1−2r2 < x1
i < 1−4r3 we can get a lower bound of the left hand side and




















It remains to show that this condition is fulﬁlled. For r = 1
2, it is obviously fulﬁlled with
equality. We show that the left hand side is decreasing on (0, 1
2) by looking at its ﬁrst




− (1 − 2r) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ 1 − r − 2r
2 ≥ 0,
which is true for 0 < r < 1
2.Information Disclosure in Innovation Contests 38
Third case. The remaining case is x1
i > 1−4r3. The expected proﬁt of ﬁrm i from hiding








































































































































































































Again, we calculate the integrals and simplify, to ﬁnally get the condition
3
2










It is fulﬁlled for r = 1
2 and increasing on (0, 1




− 1 − 2r ≥ 0 ⇐⇒
3
2
− r − 2r
2 ≥ 0,
which is true for 0 < r < 1
2. The proof is thus complete – it is never proﬁtable for one of
the ﬁrms to deviate and hide the own value. ￿
Proof of Theorem 17
We show that ﬁrm i with value x1
i has no incentive to hide her value if all other ﬁrms
reveal. This is easy to see in case x1
i > x∗: revealing the value will make all opponents stop
innovating. In case x1
i < ˆ x, there is no point in hiding – no other ﬁrm will be discouraged
from drawing if her beliefs of ﬁrm i increase to ˆ x compared to x1
i. Quite the contrary,
for some values it could make a leading ﬁrm j with ˆ x > x1
j > x1
i continue to innovate
although she would have stopped if she knew the true value of ﬁrm i.
Let us now suppose ˆ x ≤ x1
i ≤ x∗, the remaining case to show. If ﬁrm i is not leading, it
does not make a diﬀerence whether she reveals or not as her value has no inﬂuence on
the innovation behavior of the other ﬁrms. We thus have to check what happens if ﬁrm i
is in the lead. First note that by Proposition 16 she will not continue to innovate then. IfInformation Disclosure in Innovation Contests 39
she does not hide her value, she thus wins the contest in case no other ﬁrm draws or all


































If the leading ﬁrm i hides her value, the other ﬁrms believe she has value ˆ x. If the second
highest ﬁrst-period innovation value is lower than ˆ x, and ﬁrm i is thus still believed to
be the leading ﬁrm, all other ﬁrms continue to innovate for sure. If it is higher, drawing
























































We need to show that π > πh. To do this, ﬁrst note that
P
 



















n−1 − F(ˆ x)
n−1
= (1 − r)
n−1 − (1 − (n − 1)r).






i). If the same number of ﬁrms draws more






















































and we can conclude that




























































































(21)Information Disclosure in Innovation Contests 40
We prove this statement by an induction argument, where we keep F (x1
i) ﬁxed and take
q = q (x1
i) ∈ [0,1] as variable. This approach does not use all available information, as it
ignores the dependence of q (x1
i) and F (x1
i), but it is suﬃcient for our purposes.




















Note that the range of possible x1
i values in [ˆ x,x∗] depends on n and r. We thus need to























For q ∈ [0,1), we show that the left-hand side of (21) is monotone in q by looking at its
ﬁrst derivative with respect to q, which is given by


































The last step holds as 2 − r2 − 2q (1 − F (x1
i)) > 2F (x1
i) − r2 > 0, which we already
showed above. Hence, the left-hand side of (21) is decreasing in q, and as it is positive for
q = 1, it is positive on the whole range.
We now get to the inductive step. Suppose we know that (21) is true for n ﬁrms. By
multiplying with 1−q +qF (x1
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Next, we subtract the left-hand side of this equation from the left-hand side of (21) with
n + 1 ﬁrms, which amounts to





 n−1  
 















n − (1 − nr) − (1 − r)
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As the diﬀerence is positive, we showed that (21) is fulﬁlled for n+1 as well. This completes
the inductive step and the proof. ￿